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Rhee, C.H. van, The Development of Civil Procedural Law in Twentieth-Century Europe: From party 
Autonomy to Judicial Case Management and Efficiency, in: C.H. van Rhee (ed.), Judicial Case Management 
and Efficiency in Civil Litigation, Antwerpen, 2008, p. 11-25 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: FROM 
PARTY AUTONOMY TO JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT AND EFFICIENCY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Choosing a starting point and an end for a historiography of the civil procedural laws of twentieth century 
Europe from the perspective of judicial case management and efficiency is as simple as choosing these 
moments in the Europe of the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century the historiography should 
commence with the French Code de procédure civile that was adopted in 1806. It was this code, with its rather 
passive judge, that would leave its mark on the nineteenth century civil procedural law of almost all 
European states. The year 1898, in which the influential Austrian Zivilprozessordnung (öZPO) of the 1st of 
August 1895 took effect,1 marked the end of the era of nineteenth century civil procedure. Both within and 
outside Europe the Austrian Zivilprozessordnung with its active judge would, to a great extent, take over 
from the French Code de procédure civile the task of setting the example. This end simultaneously forms the 
starting point of the twentieth century civil procedural law from the perspective of judicial case 
management and efficiency. With regard to this area of the law the recently passed century therefore 
already commenced before the turn of the century. 
As regards the end of the era of twentieth century civil procedure, I would like to set this end in 1999, 
the year in which the English Civil Procedure Rules came into force, despite the fact that the choice of this 
moment in a period that has passed only so recently is precarious. The adoption of these rules also caused a 
change in trend as regards the position of the judge who now also in England and Wales has acquired 
extensive case management powers. Although this change is felt especially in England and Wales, this 
development is also of great significance to Europe, as the new Rules in one step bring English civil 
procedural law closer to its continental counterparts than it has been in centuries. Moreover chances are 
considerable that the new English Rules will influence legal development in other countries. For example, 
the large interest for the English developments in the Netherlands is striking. The commission that was 
composed there to fundamentally review the Code of Civil Procedure and other statutes has recently 
finished its task. It has paid extensive attention to the English developments.2 With this, however, I enter 
the twenty-first century and venture myself outside the central period I would like to discuss here. 
Alongside the years 1898 and 1999 belong the names of two important ‘proceduralists’: the Austrian 
Dr. Franz Klein (1854-1926) and the Englishman Lord Harry Kenneth Woolf (1933). Klein was the father of 
the Austrian Zivilprozessordnung, while Lord Woolf filled the same position for the English Rules. When 
reading the present paper one should realize that especially the accomplishments of these two individuals 
are pivotal. 
2. THE STARTING POINT: THE AUSTRIAN ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 
Until 1898 the Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung of 1781 applied in Austria. The draughtsman of this 
Gerichtsordnung was the originally Swiss Joseph Hyazinth von Froidevo (1735-1811).3 Von Froidevo’s 
procedural model is characterized by W. Jelinek as follows: ‘zwar schriftlich, heimlich, von der 
Eventualmaxime geprägt und mittelbar, jedoch von extremer Parteiherrschaft gekennzeichnet’ (admittedly 
written, secret, stamped by the Eventualmaxime and mediate, but at the same time characterized by the 
domination of the parties).4 However, in 1873 this changed for small claims with the implementation of the 
Bagatellverfahren. The Bagatellverfahren was characterized by orality, immediacy in proof proceedings and a 
free evaluation of evidence.5 Due to this, part of the changes that the implementation of the Austrian 
Zivilprozessordnung brought in 1898 had already been realized before that time. It is important to keep this 
in mind as we take a closer look at the Zivilprozessordnung and the history of her materialization. 
                                                             
1 See e.g. Oberhammer & Domej 2005, p. 118 et seq. 
2 Asser, Groen & Vranken 2003; Asser, Groen & Vranken 2006. 
3 Jelinek 1991, p. 50. 
4 Jelinek 1991, p. 49. 
5 Jelinek 1991, p. 53. 
In the period of 1890-1891 the Privatdozent Franz Klein expounded his ideas about civil procedure in a 
series of articles in the Juristische Blätter. These articles were later brought together in his well known Pro 
Futuro. Betrachtungen über Probleme der Civilprocessreform in Oesterreich (Leipzig/Vienna 1891).6 Evidently 
Klein drew attention with his articles, as on 17 February 1891 he was appointed Ministerialsekretär in the 
Austrian Ministry of Justice. He was given the task of reforming Austrian civil procedural law, which had 
been attempted a number of times without success.7 
Already in 1893 the draft for the Code of Civil Procedure had been completed, in addition to a draft-
Jurisdiktionsnorm (this Code contains regulations on the organization of the judiciary and related issues) and 
a draft-Exekutionsordnung (Enforcement Code). The Code of Civil Procedure was implemented five years 
later, in 1898. 
According to Winfred Kralik in Forschungsband Franz Klein,8 the main goal of Klein’s activities on the 
Code of Civil Procedure was to improve the practice of litigation. His aim – and this may not come 
unexpectedly to an expert on the history of civil procedural law – was to create procedural regulations that 
would induce fast and cheap litigation, leading to a judgement based on the facts as they had happened in 
actual practice (the ‘substantive truth’ hereafter, as opposed to the ‘formal truth’, i.e. the truth as advanced 
by the parties). Procedural formalities were to be pushed back as much as possible and the judge was given 
an active role in the conduct of the action. 
Various authors agree that Klein’s virtue was not so much that he developed new ideas about 
procedural law, but that his importance should be sought in the fact that he combined existing views in a 
valuable manner.9 Here one could point out his leading principle, the realization of the Sozialfunktion of 
civil procedure. This Sozialfunktion is a reaction to the liberal view of legal proceedings of the nineteenth 
century, a view that pervaded the French Code de procédure civile; after all this Code saw civil procedure as a 
struggle between independent citizens, who decided for themselves about the way in which they would 
solve their disputes. Conversely, those who lay the emphasis on the Sozialfunktion place litigation in a much 
wider framework. When this principle is observed, one will pay attention to its two constituent elements, 
namely the fact that settling specific disputes is not the sole purpose of civil procedure but that it also serves 
the common good (Wohlfahrtsfunktion), and that civil litigation should be looked at from an economic angle. 
Franz von Zeiller (1751-1828), the creator of the Austrian Civil Code of 1811, already formulated the 
Wohlfahrtsfunktion clearly.10 With regard to the economic perspective (for example the fact that the legal 
process should not be a way to postpone the payment of debts or to acquire money against a low interest 
rate), one could point out Klein’s tutor, Anton Menger (1814-1906).11 
When summarising the most important characteristics of the new procedural model one comes to the 
following list: (a) the pushing back of the role of preliminary defences (exceptions), (b) far-reaching case 
management powers of the judge, who ex officio safeguards the (short) terms for performing the various 
procedural steps12 and who has important powers in the field of the inquiry into the facts of the case, (c) a 
division of the lawsuit in a written preparatory phase and an oral main phase that should, if possible, take 
place in a single court-session, (d) a strict implementation of the Preklusion principle, that is to say, the 
principle that specific procedural steps cannot be taken anymore after the given time period has expired, 
and (e) the ex officio notification to the opponent party of the various procedural documents that have been 
submitted to the court.13 This list is an indication that Klein was predominantly looking for a new balance 
between the powers of the judge and those of the parties. 
To limit the length of this contribution, I will only further examine elements a-c. 
2.1. Preliminary Defences (exceptions) 
Important characteristics of legal proceedings that are shaped according to the Sozialfunktion are efficiency 
and speed. It shall be clear to anyone who has knowledge of the delaying effects that preliminary defences 
have,14 that Klein primarily wanted to limit the use of these preliminary defences. At the time of Klein 
preliminary defences were especially detrimental since, according to the Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung 1781 
the Austrian judge, as his colleagues in many other European countries, usually had to decide on these 
                                                             
6 For Klein’s bibliography, see: Hofmeister 1988, p. 67-78. 
7 Sprung 1988, p. 26. 
8 Kralik 1988, p. 89. 
9 Fasching 1988, p. 101-102. 
10 Von Zeiller 1808, p. 133-147. 
11 Fasching 1988, p. 101-102. 
12 Kralik 1988, p. 94-95. 
13 Stürner 1991, p. 19. 
14 See Van Rhee 2005, p. 88-105. 
preliminary defences in a separate judgement; until this judgement was pronounced, the proceedings were 
halted. However, as we shall see hereafter, the pushing back of preliminary defences is just what Klein was 
not very successful in. 
An important reason for the frequent use of preliminary defences in eighteenth century Austria were 
the complicated rules on jurisdiction. These rules gave rise to preliminary defences stating, for example, 
that the action had been brought before the wrong court. Klein pleaded for simplifying these rules. 
Furthermore Klein wished to limit the raising of preliminary defences to a set moment in time in the 
proceedings: they were only to be permitted at the moment that the case came before the judge the first 
time (in der ersten Tagsatzung).15 When analysing the situation as it was after the implementation of Klein’s 
reforms, one would have to conclude that the Austrian rules on jurisdiction have not become simpler, and 
that the attempt to bring the preliminary defences together during the first hearing of the case was only 
partially successful.16 
Other suggestions Klein made with regard to the preliminary defences were more successful. For 
example, the appeal proceedings concerning preliminary defences were simplified and the pace of the 
hearing of these proceedings was increased. This was realized by incorporating the decision at first instance 
in a Beschluss instead of in a Prozessurteil, which was common practice in Germany. Contrary to a 
Prozessurteil, against which Berufung was possible, only the legal remedy Rekurs was accepted against a 
Beschluss. This remedy had a simpler set-up than Berufung and could only be applied once.17 Furthermore it 
was decided that a preliminary defence (apart from one regarding a Prozesskostenkaution, i.e. the 
preliminary defence that the opponent party should make a deposit with the court for the costs of the 
lawsuit) would no longer be a ground to refuse to try a case. Besides this it was left to the judge’s discretion 
whether to decide by separate judgement about a preliminary defence raised, in the judge’s opinion, 
without good grounds. In this manner he could leave the possibility of appeal against this judgement open, 
or postpone the decision about the preliminary defence until the final judgement. With this last method a 
delay in the conduct of a case due to the suspending nature of an appeal against an interlocutory judgement 
was prevented.18 
2.2. Judicial Case Management and the Search for the Substantive Truth 
Apart from the measures taken regarding the preliminary defences, Klein’s draft also brought reform in the 
field of the inquiry into the facts of the case. The judge received a materielle Prozessleitungspflicht (this active 
attitude of the judge is in accordance with the Sozialfunktion of the legal procedure; after all, inconsistent 
with the liberal view that promotes a passive attitude; the interests that are linked to the case are not 
necessarily the interests of the individual parties).19 This active role of the judge promotes the search for the 
substantive truth, and can be realized by asking questions ex officio and also, for example, by the collecting 
of evidence on the judge’s initiative. In practice, however, the final implementation of the Prozess-
leitungspflicht is dependent on the good will and skills of the judge. In the period after the implementation 
of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure the Prozessleitungspflicht appears to have lead to positive results, 
despite the fact that the penalty for violation of this duty only consisted of the possibility for the parties to 
lodge an appeal based on irregularities in the procedure (Berufung wegen Verfahrensmangel).  
It should be noted that the active attitude of the judge was seen as a typical German contribution to 
procedural law at the time. It was claimed, however, that in Germany the situation changed under French 
influence as a result of the introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 (ZPO). For example, in 
Prussia the existing Offizialbetrieb principle (i.e. the principle of the active judge) was replaced by the 
Parteibetrieb principle (the passive judge) due to the implementation of the ZPO.20 
Klein’s preference for an active judge brought along that he was unfavourably disposed towards the 
Verhandlungsmaxime, i.e. the principle of party control over allegations and proof. According to Klein this 
Maxime only lead to a situation where the parties were given the possibility to tempt the judge to give an 
incorrect, only partially correct, or unclear judgement.21 
                                                             
15 Materialien zu den neuen österreichischen Civilprocessgesetzen, Vol. 1, Vienna: Manz, 1897, p. 286; Klein 1894, p. 52. 
16 Kralik 1988, p. 90; Materialien, supra note 15, p. 322. 
17 Materialien, supra note 15, p. 339 et seq. and p. 363 et seq.; Klein 1900, p. 272 et seq.; Klein & Engel 1927, p. 451 et seq.; Sperl 
1926, p. 435.  
18 Kralik 1988, p. 90-91; Materialien, supra note 15, p. 30 et seq. and p. 294 et seq.; Klein 1891, p. 51 et seq.; Sperl 1926, p. 435; 
Klein & Engel 1927, p. 313. 
19 Fasching 1988, p. 102. 
20 Damrau 1988, p. 161. 
21 Klein 1891, p. 13. See also Kralik 1988, p. 91. 
Although Klein did not like to use the word Inquisitionsmaxime, the procedure he designed still got a 
somewhat inquisitorial character. This, however, will not have saddened him, because in his view the rules 
of procedure should offer ample opportunity to find the substantive truth. 
Following on the more inquisitorial character of the procedure and the strive, after the substantive 
truth a duty of truth for the parties (Wahrheitspflicht) was implemented. This duty did not only apply in the 
proof stage, but already during pleading. Whether this duty of truth actually lead to results is controversial. 
W. Kralik, for example, describes her as a mere ‘ethical postulate’.22 
Klein’s perception of civil litigation as a search for the substantive truth also manifests itself in what 
he called the ‘gegenseitige Unterstützung der Prozessparteien’.23 This ‘Unterstützung’ implies that every 
party can ask her opponent questions, or have questions asked, about facts and circumstances unknown to 
her as well as about proof. One will now instantly think of the Anglo-American ‘discovery’ (currently 
known as ‘disclosure’ in England) and this is very appropriate: Klein himself already associated this 
procedure with it.24 
2.3. A Written Preparatory Phase and an Oral Main Phase 
According to Klein an efficient pace of civil litigation and the search for the substantive truth are stimulated 
by an oral procedure and immediacy during proof proceedings.25 Nevertheless the procedure shaped by 
Klein was not entirely oral. Apart from the preparatory written phase of the proceedings before an unus 
iudex,26 writing also played a role in the second ‘oral phase’. Due to the prohibition to introduce new facts 
on appeal (the so-called Neuerungsverbot),27 it was consequently very important that a reliable protocol was 
kept during the oral phase. Nonetheless, according to many this criterion deprived the oral phase of a large 
part of its dynamics,28 resulting in criticism of Klein.29 Despite this criticism, however, it can still be said 
that Klein’s approach was modern. His intention, after all, was to increase the speed of litigation by 
providing the judge with instruments to prepare the case (during the mainly written preparatory phase) to 
such an extent that it could be decided in a single session in the oral main phase.30 Adjournments of the 
hearing should be avoided as much as possible (this is in accordance with the principle of the einheitliche 
mündliche Streitverhandlung). To attain the latter it was determined in the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure 
that, apart from adjournments that were explicitly provided by law, the judge was under no circumstances 
to allow other adjournments. The only concession Klein made, be it against his will, was that the case could 
be stalled for a period of time at the request of both parties. 
                                                            
Unfortunately it has to be acknowledged that the preparatory phase died an early death in Austria.31 
After World War II it no longer occurred in practice and in 1983 the Articles that were related to this phase 
were removed from the Austrian Code.32 
3. AUSTRIA’S EXEMPLARY POSITION 
The Austrian civil procedural law was very influential in Europe (and beyond) for a long period of time; 
without a doubt it was exemplary. Firstly, the influence in Germany has been very significant. For example, 
here one could think of the Novelle of the German Minister of Justice Emminger from 1924. In accordance 
with Austrian law Emminger expanded the powers of the judge. According to the Novelle the judge became 
responsible for the observance of time limits. At the same time, a concentrated oral hearing was aimed for. 
Furthermore a preparatory phase under the leadership of an unus iudex was introduced. Additionally in a 
Novelle from 1933 the duty of truth for the parties (Wahrheitspflicht) from Austrian procedural law was 
 
22 Kralik 1988, p. 91-92. 
23 Klein 1891, p. 36. 
24 Klein 1891, p. 41 & p. 46 et seq. 
25 Klein 1900, p. 31; Klein 1891, p. 87 et seq.; Fasching 1988, p. 112. 
26 Jelinek 1991, p. 69. 
27 Fasching 1988, p. 111. The aim of the Neuerungsverbot was to concentrate on first instance proceedings and thereby reduce 
the workload of the appeal courts. The prohibition was not an invention of Klein; it was adopted from the Allgemeine 
Gerichtsordnung 1781, Paragraph 257. The prohibition was implemented in a stricter manner than Klein himself had 
wanted. See Fasching 1988, p. 109-110, and Jelinek 1991, p. 51: ‘Das Verbot neuen tatsächlichen Vorbringens in der 
Berufungsinstanz entstammt der öAGO; der Versuch Kleins, dieses Verbot zu lockern, ist gescheitert’. 
28 For that matter, in practice the protocol has become more and more a short summary of the hearing. Originally the idea 
was that a detailed account would be made. Kralik 1988, p. 93-94. 
29 E.g. Demelius 1895; Sperl 1926, p. 419. 
30 Fasching 1988, p. 113. 
31 Jelinek 1991, p. 49.  
32 Jelinek 1991, p. 69. 
adopted.33 Other examples, and so there are many more, are the influence of the Austrian Neuerungsverbot 
that led to restrictions concerning the introduction of new facts on appeal in Germany34 and the 
implementation of the notification of judgements to the parties by the court in 1976.35 According to several 
authors the German procedural model in turn influenced Austrian procedural law (especially at the 
doctrinal and structural level).These same authors maintain that as a result one may speak of an Austrian-
German model of civil procedure. 
Apart from Germany there are other European countries that experienced the influence of Austrian 
procedural law.36 First one may refer to the Central and Eastern-European countries that still belonged to 
the Austrian-Hungarian Double Monarchy in 1898. Additionally there was Austrian influence apparent in 
Scandinavia, Greece, Lichtenstein, and the Swiss Kanton Zurich. Also in Italian scholarly writing, but less 
so in the Codice di procedura civile (1940) itself, Austrian influences can be found that were possibly exerted 
from the former Austrian areas in modern day Italy. Through Italy some influence might be discerned on 
the Iberian Peninsula. Even the French juge de la mise en état may have been inspired by the Austrian 
‘preparatory judge’. 
In the Netherlands little attention was paid to the Austrian procedural model for a long time. As a 
result, the Netherlands are not discussed in a recent collection of essays on the influence of the Austrian-
German procedural model abroad.37 Taking note of the reform proposals in the area of the Dutch civil 
procedural law from the beginning of the twentieth century it appears that this is unjustified. These reform 
proposals called into existence draft bills of the Nederlandsche Juristenvereniging (Dutch Association of 
Lawyers), the Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond (Liberal Democratic Society) and a draft bill by the government-
appointed Gratama Commission. The fact that the Austrian influence in the Netherlands nevertheless did not 
get any attention was probably due to the fact that these draft bills were not adopted. As a result, for a long 
period of time, Dutch civil procedural law was behind when considered from a European perspective. 
In another context38 I already paid attention to the aforementioned reform proposals. In the current 
contribution I will therefore confine myself to a summary of some of my findings in connection with the 
most important bill, that of the Gratama Commission. 
4. THE GRATAMA (DRAFT) BILL 
To a great extent the Gratama bill was inspired by Klein’s Austrian ZPO. This becomes apparent where 
emphasis is placed on (a) the diminution of the role of preliminary defences (exceptions), (b) the case 
management powers of the judge and the search for the substantive truth, and (c) the division of the 
proceedings into two stages, with an oral hearing in the second stage. 
4.1. Preliminary Defences (exceptions) 
The Gratama Commission, like the creator of the Austrian ZPO, paid attention to the delaying effect of 
preliminary defences on litigation. The aim was to eliminate the distinction made between preliminary 
defences and the defence on the merits. The Gratama Commission was of the opinion that this distinction 
gave rise to too many differences in opinion and resulted in undue delay. Consequently the draft bill did 
not include such a distinction. The system suggested by the bill was that, apart from the defence that the 
court was not competent ratione territoriae every defence could be brought forward at any time in the 
procedure. However, a restriction was imposed that left it to the judge to determine whether the defence 
could have been presented earlier. If the judge was convinced this was the case he ought to reject the 
defence in order to ‘prevent unreasonable delay and prejudice to the other party’. 
4.2. Judicial Case Management and a Search for the Substantive Truth 
For the Gratama Commission the new Austrian ZPO also formed the prime example for the position of the 
judge in the legal procedure. In the Commission’s bill the authority of the judge was thus extended 
regarding the determination of the time limits, the oral hearing and the preparation of the case for 
judgement. 
                                                             
33 Jelinek 1991, p. 69; Damrau 1988, p. 166. 
34 Stürner 1991, p. 21. 
35 Damrau 1988, p. 163. 
36 See Habscheid 1991. 
37 Habscheid 1991. 
38 Van Rhee 2000, p. 331-346. 
Regarding the time limits for the exchange of the statements of case (i.e. statement of defence, reply 
and rejoinder; a separate statement of claim was not submitted anymore since the statement of claim should 
be part of the summons according to the bill) the parties were deprived of any influence on their length. 
The time limits were to be determined by the examining judge, making due allowance for the circumstances 
of the case. A term was not permitted to be longer than four weeks under any circumstances, even if it was 
evident in advance that this maximum term of four weeks would be too short. Nevertheless, once a term 
had commenced (and this also applied for other terms than those for the exchange of statements of case), it 
could be prolonged (such that it exceeded four weeks) or reduced. Since prolongation or reduction could 
even occur ex officio, the judge was once more granted great freedom. The possibility for parties to let the 
procedure linger for some time, as it existed in Austria, was absent in the Gratama Draft. 
The fact that case management was entrusted to the judge is very evident from the rules concerning 
the oral hearing. The Gratama bill differentiates itself from the system in which the parties are heard in a 
fixed order. The entire regulation of the oral hearing is orientated towards an informal discussion, in which 
the presiding judge determines the order in which the parties are given the opportunity to expound their 
case. There is thus the possibility that the defendant or his counsel is heard first, something that was 
contrary to the existing practice where the plaintiff came first. In addition both the judges and counsel from 
both sides were given the opportunity to question the parties. The parties themselves were also allowed to 
present their opponent party with questions. Once again it was the presiding judge who determined the 
order in which the parties were questioned. The court could even ex officio decide that a certain question 
would not be permitted. 
Similar to the Austrian ZPO, the Gratama bill was aimed at the discovery of the substantive truth. This 
is, inter alia, apparent from the active role the judge fulfils with regard to the hearing of witnesses. The 
judge could even decide ex officio that the hearing of (further) witnesses was required. For this purpose he 
was free to select witnesses himself. Only if both parties opposed to the hearing of a specific witness by the 
judge ex officio, this witness could not be heard. 
4.3. A Written Preparatory Phase and an Oral Main Phase 
As stated above, according to the Austrian Code an action was subdivided into a written preparatory phase 
and a largely oral main phase, in which the case was preferably prepared for adjudication in one session. 
The Gratama bill also sub-divided the procedure into a written preparatory phase and an ensuing oral 
hearing. The emphasis was to be laid on the oral hearing. This main stage could only be omitted if the 
parties requested the judge in charge of the written preparatory phase to decide the case on the basis of the 
documents that had been submitted. 
The general rule, nevertheless, was that after the initial phase an oral main phase would take place 
before a panel of judges. Parties had the duty to appear before this panel in person, save exemption in 
exceptional cases. Before the panel the parties and their counsel had the opportunity to elucidate their case. 
This entire oral phase was to be aimed at the search for the substantive truth. 
5. THE FINAL STAGE OF TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS: THE ENGLISH 
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES (1999) 
We have now come to the end of the history of the civil procedural law of the twentieth century and the 
role of case management. At the end of the aforementioned century Paul Michalik alleged that ‘It is well 
recognized that the existing system of civil procedure in England and Wales is beset by excessive costs, 
delay, and complexity’.39 The main objective of Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls at the time and drafter of the 
English Civil Procedure Rules was to change this situation. To this end he did far-reaching proposals in his 
two reports Access to Justice. To a great extent the proposals mentioned in these reports were implemented 
by the new Civil Procedure Rules that became effective in 1999. The international importance of these rules 
does not lie in the fact that they had significant influence on the development of procedural law in other 
European countries, at least not until now. In view of the short time span between the implementation of 
the English Rules and the end of the twentieth century this would be inconceivable. However, that in the 
period to come the English Rules will be influential on the European Continent may be anticipated by, for 
example, the attention for them in the Netherlands. Particularly the three procedural tracks that the new 
English Rules distinguish could be of interest outside England, as well as the pre-action protocols. Before 
addressing these tracks and protocols, however, some observations must be made as regards the impor-
tance of English procedural law for the development of law in the twentieth century. In my opinion, this 
                                                             
39 Michalik 1999, p. 117-165. 
importance lies primarily in the fact that the new Rules reduced the adversarial character of English civil 
actions, increasing the judge’s case management powers considerably, and that, consequently, English legal 
procedure was brought closer to the Continental procedural models. After all, in the past the contrast 
between English civil procedural law and that of the Continent was mainly to be found in the fact that the 
English judge was more passive in the conduct of a civil case than his continental colleagues. In England 
there was no question of far-reaching case management powers of the judge, as is the case in Austria and 
Germany, but rather a judge who oversaw the case as an umpire. This situation was changed only in 1999 
by the new Rules. Before that time, litigation in England was slow and this was mainly due to a lack of 
discipline during the legal proceedings. 
In theory English civil actions were to go smoothly. An important means to achieve this situation were 
(and still are) the so-called ‘directions’. These directions contain instructions from the judge on the course of 
the legal proceedings in the pre-trial phase, the preparatory phase in which the case is prepared for oral 
hearing in the main phase (trial). The directions are given after the parties have presented their statements 
of case (in uncomplicated cases, automatic directions apply). They contain, inter alia, deadlines for the 
exchange of lists that state which documents the parties possess that could be of importance to the trial 
(‘discovery’, currently referred to as ‘disclosure’), the inspection of documents, the exchange of expert 
evidence, written testimonies of witnesses, etc. Although at first glance this system prescribes an exact 
schedule that prevents delays, the reality was different. Firstly, the sanctions that could be imposed if the 
directions were not complied with were not effective. The sanction usually existed merely of the order to 
indemnify the costs that had been caused without reason. Furthermore there was the judge’s tolerant 
attitude regarding exemptions from the failure to comply with the civil procedure rules. According to P. 
Michalik this tolerant attitude was a reaction to the strict discipline in civil litigation that was observed 
before the implementation of the Judicature Acts 1873-1875 (these Acts brought along fundamental reform of 
English procedural law). Michalik states: ‘A new spirit of liberality was inaugurated, which has since 
become firmly established at the heart of English civil procedure’. This was expressed in two cases from the 
late nineteenth century quoted by Michalik. In the first case Brett MR stated: 
‘However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the 
amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other 
side can be compensated in costs’.40 
In the second case Bowen LJ agreed with this and added: 
‘[T]he object of the courts is to decide the rights of parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the 
conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights […]. I know of no kind of error or 
mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can be done without 
injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in 
controversy […]. It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will 
not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it 
corrected, if it can be done without injustice’.41 
The only exception to the rule, that failing to observe the relevant civil procedure rules could be excused, 
was the circumstance that the error could not be atoned for by compensating the costs. However, the 
traditional approach of the English courts was that compensation of the costs was sufficient in almost all 
cases. 
According to Lord Woolf the ‘adversarial culture’ was the root of many of the problems in English 
procedural law, particularly in the pre-trial phase. Consequently Lord Woolf dedicated himself to the 
introduction of ‘judicial case management’. According to his case management method the judges are 
responsible for the course of the procedure in every phase of the legal proceedings. The judges and the 
supporting judicial staff ensure that a balance exists between, on the one hand the significance and 
complexity of the case, and on the other hand the procedural techniques applied and the costs made. A 
standardized regulation of three ‘tracks’ has been adopted. These tracks are used depending on the 
significance and complexity of a case. Small cases can be dealt with in the informal small-claims track, 
whereas the multi track can be used for complicated cases. For the remaining cases there is the fast-track 
procedure. Furthermore only limited legal costs can be recovered from the loosing party, and eventually the 
procedural rules were unified and simplified for the County Courts and the High Court. 
Lord Woolf’s report encourages parties to embrace a new attitude in which co-operation is 
emphasized. Lord Woolf would like to see cases settled amicably, at an early stage in the procedure, more 
                                                             
40 Clarapede & Co. v. Commercial Union Association (1883) 32 WR 262, 263. 
41 Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Chapter D. 700, 710 11. 
regularly. For certain cases the learned Lord introduced pre-action protocols. These protocols explain how the 
parties and their counsel should behave before a case is commenced, and indicate how long the procedural 
steps they need to take should last. According to Lord Woolf public funds ought to be invested in ADR-
techniques simultaneously, thereby relieving the courts. 
In addition the Bowman Committee dealt with litigation on appeal. As a result of the proposals of this 
committee, the system of leave for appeal, which was already known at the House of Lords, has been 
extended to the Court of Appeal. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this contribution I have tried to demonstrate that for the civil procedural law in Europe the twentieth 
century, especially from the perspective of case management, lasted 101 years, from 1898 to 1999. From the 
issues discussed one could conclude that there has been a development in the sense that civil procedural 
law was originally dominated by the liberal nineteenth century procedural model with its comprehensive 
party autonomy, and that it became eventually judge-centered (with the 1898 Austrian Code of Civil 
Procedure as the first example of the new approach). It appears that Austria paved the way, whereas 
England, in contrast, was one of the last countries to depart from the purely adversarial approach. It was 
not until 1999 that English civil procedure reduced the far-reaching powers of the parties in the conduct of 
civil litigation, increasing, at the same time, the judge’s case management powers. The given picture is, 
however, so simple that it is almost too good to be true. Moreover it is not true, certainly not if one follows 
the developments in Central and Eastern Europe closely. In my opinion one cannot speak of a rising line 
with respect to the judge’s case management powers, but rather of a cyclic movement whereby the 
emphasis lies temporarily on party autonomy, and then once again on the judge’s case management 
powers. A Central European country, Croatia, may serve as an example. Given that Croatia formed part of 
the Austrian-Hungarian Double Monarchy, the procedural law in this country was already influenced by 
Franz Klein’s procedural model, with its active judge, at an early stage. In Croatia, however, the judge’s 
active attitude became suspect during the Socialist period, when Croatia formed part of the Yugoslav 
Federation. As a reaction to the procedural law from this period, that was dominated by the Unter-
suchungsmaxime, at present one can discern a striving for the strengthening of party autonomy. In other 
former Socialist countries it seems that similar developments are occurring. It remains to be seen if, and in 
what way, these developments will influence the civil procedural law in an expanding European Union. 
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